Friday, September 19, 2014

More on Lacan

Lacan offers a bit of a critique of the mirror stage -- not just exposition but objections.  Some ideas: this stage -- occurring between 6 to 18 months -- “places the primordial I in a fictional direction.”

It’s a mirage, a gestalt, a statue, a phantom, an automaton, an illusion, a projection.

A kind of fundamental hallucination

He says that the mirror-I is “more constituent than constituted” -- that is, this mere part takes the place of the whole -- stands-in for it -- fixes it, inverts it, sets it up as a basic opposition:

                                    Same                          Turbulent
                                    Thing                          Changing
                                    Over                           Over
                                    Here                           Here

Inaugurating the mental phenomena of the I -- the subject enframed into the mirror I


Lacan regards the mirror as a trap.  It sells the obligation to harden and become a ‘this.’

Fragment overwhelms whole -- simple versus complex -- stagnant versus dynamism. 

The thing that cannot possibly be seen as self-contained and self-sufficient -- 

is shaped and projected into a thing that is seen as wholly self-contained and self-sufficient

Some of his enigmatic sayings -- themes for thought:

from this point on the I that thinks cannot be the I that is

Return to Hegel: the I can only know itself in terms of an I that can recognize the I -- 
therefore self-consciousness can only fulfill itself in another self-consciousness -- 

'Future anterior' (Jacques Lacan) = later idea of 'Anticipated belatedness' (Samuel Weber)

“I am launching myself into a field to find out what I might have become”

                                                                 ?


Notes on Lacan

The Mirror Stage

According to Lacan, when the infant recognizes herself in a mirror, she is suddenly confronted with an image of herself – whereas she previously experienced existence in fragments intersected with libidinal needs -- the wholeness in the image lends itself to the seeking-wholeness looking at itself -- what the child sees in the mirror Lacan calls the "Ideal-I" (Lacan, Mirror Stage, 2). This ego ideal provides an image of wholeness which constitutes the ego. Like Freud Lacan thinks the ego is formed through an external force; in this case, the sudden realization of a complete image of the self that appears in the mirror; which counteracts an infant’s primordial sense of her fragmented body.

Words that Lacan associates with this event are: jubilant, specular image, mirror stage,   -- still sunk in his motor incapacity, nursing, dependency -- the I is precipitated in a primordial form before it is ‘objectified’ in the dialectic of identification with the other.

This image in the mirror is the image of coherence – of what makes the world and our place as complete subjects in it make sense -- the image has a framing, forming power. Internal self is drawn to external image -- internal ‘self-identifies’ via external. The mirror stage is the infant’s first encounter with subjectivity.  It reorients spatial relations.  It congeals an external sense of coherence, and with a sense of "I" and "You."

Lacan’s Three Orders

The three orders are the fundamental dimensions of psychical subjectivity -- they are spaces in which aspects of subjectivity are operating -- this is a way of situating the subject within a system of perception and a dialogue with the external world -- they are sites of trying-to-be -- these are the battlefields in which the subject struggles for its identity -- at first the most important part of the message here is that the thing we are struggling with in order to be is cultural -- but with a deeper look we see that Lacan is very aware that there are biological instincts and material realities --

The Imaginary

The imaginary becomes the internalized image of this ideal, whole self and is situated around the tension between coherence versus fragmentation. The imaginary can roughly be aligned with the formation of the ego -- which serves as the mediator between the internal and the external world -- it creates new potential-spaces

With his choice of the word “imaginary,” Lacan intends to designate that which is fictional, simulated, virtual, fantasy. However, the phenomena of the imaginary are necessary -- these are basic fantasies -- transcendental apperception -- also in Kantian terms, phainomenon

            The imaginary as the ego ---- I, adult, reality-principle
                        In Sanskrit -- atman

The Symbolic

The symbolic is the formation of marks, signifiers and language -- thus it is considered to be the "determining order of the subject" -- the subject exits the alienated body and migrates to the logos. 

"Symbols envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join together, before he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him…"

"The human being speaks but does so because the symbol has made this thing human.”

The symbolic order functions as the way in which the subject is organized and, to a certain extent, how the psyche becomes accessible. It is associated with language, with words, with writing and can be aligned with Peirce’s “symbol” and Saussure’s “signifier.”

The symbolic register refers to the customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, rules, traditions -- the stuff of society -- Lacan's phrase “symbolic order,” which encompasses all of the preceding, can be understood as roughly equivalent to what Hegel designates as “objective spirit” -- the non-natural universe as an elaborate set of inter-subjective and trans-subjective contexts into which individual human beings are thrown at birth (Heidegger’s Geworfenheit), a pre-existing order preparing places for human beings in advance and influencing the vicissitudes of their ensuing lives. 

            The symbolic as the conscience ---- culture, superego, repression, parent
                        In Sanskrit -- dharma (duty)

The Real

The real is that which resists representation, whatever is pre-mirror, pre-imaginary,   and pre-symbolic …

what loses its ‘reality’ once it is imagined (seen as a ploy for wholeness) or symbolized (made conscious through language).

It is “the aspect where images and words fail.”

Words that Lacan associates with the real:  ineliminable, foreclosed, approached but never grasped, umbilical cord … the real is everything that is not invented -- not media, but instead everything that informs media -- the real behind the endless cultural  hyperreality.

The real is that which is foreign to Imaginary-Symbolic framing and remains elusive, resisting by nature capture in any comprehensibly meaningful formulations of concatenations of Imaginary-Symbolic signs.  It is a transcendence troubling and thwarting Imaginary-Symbolic imaging and speaking from without -- as well as an immanence perturbing and subverting whatever is imaged or spoken from within -- it is restless

It comes to be associated with libido, matter, contingency and traumatic events, unbearable bodily intensities, anxiety, and death.  It is the hypokeimenon. 

            The real as the Id ---- child, instinct, wanting, needing -- pleasure principle --

                        in Sanskrit, tanha (thirst)

Thursday, September 18, 2014

Notes on Foucault

Nietzsche shows that morality has a genealogy.  This does not mean that animals lack all moral sense.  Foucault shows that sexuality has a history.  This does not mean that sex is not biological.

Whatever else is true -- everyone has been shaped as a sexual being by centuries of teachings in the societies in which we grow up.

F: “It is through a process of designation or self-designation as a particular sexual identity that we are led to believe that we know ourselves, that we have discovered the truth of our being.”

F: “What needs to be examined is the oft-stated theme that sex is outside of discourse and that the only way to clear a path to it is by removing an obstacle and breaking a secret.”

F: “There is a significant difference between prohibitions about sexuality and other forms of prohibition.  Unlike other prohibitions, sexual prohibitions are constantly connected with the obligation to tell the truth about oneself.”



Foucault shows how official knowledges about sexuality begin to infiltrate daily life.

One of his claims is that sexual scientists of the nineteenth century did not invent techniques and methods for uncovering hidden truths about sex, but instead they produced sexuality in its new incarnation as an official category of knowledge.

The compulsion to confess creates the confession; and the edict to reveal the truth creates the unrevealed secret.

Sexuality is a discourse in this sense (it creates a discourse -- it reaches out to this)

Eros poetes logoi

Love gives us a tongue, love speaks itself via us, erotic impulse verbalizes itself in the yawning, crying, singing, howling voices of the forest and, finally, among humans

Sexuality is a discourse because sexuality creates discourse -- makes us talk

Culture demands us to speak the truth about our sexual encounters, secrets and acts

When we examine the way power has evolved in Western history from tyranny to democracy we begin to ask the question whether we have still not cut off the head of the king -- in politics, the hierarchy lives on -- Foucault is asking: what about in sex?

“What I am arguing for is sex without the law and power without the king.”

Foucault becomes convinced that Western culture in its Christian tradition leads its subjects to conceive of themselves in relationship to desire.   Studying this history helps us see how individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves and decipher and recognize and acknowledge themselves in relationship to desire. 

Foucault’s early work describes the self as the product of the structures of society and downplays any sense of individual agency.  In later works he talks about the agency of the subject.  His approach to these problems is practical:

“The ethics of the concern for self is a practice of freedom.”

“I would say that if I am now interested in how the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are however not simply invented by the individual himself.   They are models that he finds it is culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, society, and his cultural group.”

So he seems to be talking about a constructed subject and is not talking about an essential subject, and the subject is not operating autonomously but relatedly … responding to, rather than in isolation from, the society … and the subject has a body also and his species an evolutionary past, and he is alive ...

The point is to see how the self has been taught to see itself in the midst of power relations and then to seize this power dynamic for oneself and wrestle with limits and thus try to live-make the self 

What we see in the past is not a utopian template for restructuring our society or discovering ourselves.   Old models offer ideas and heuristic guides for questioning the limits and possibilities of projects for self-creation today.  We are studying history to be free in the present -- to help liberate ourselves 

The pleasures of the body were seen as natural but also dangerous because they appealed to man's lower or animal side and because their intensity could lead to overindulgence and thereby to a failure of mastery (enkrateia).   A certain amount of privation was felt to be good and to intensify desire such that austerity became a means of refining and increasing the pleasure when one finally indulged (hedone). 

“The achievement of self-mastery through the acetic ideal assured for the Greeks a form of wisdom that brought them into direct contact with some superior element in human nature and gave them access to the very essence of truth.”

“An essence of the Greek understanding of ethos is that it is a mode of behavior in which humanizing mastery of the self is not a denial of our earthly condition but is understood and even appreciated as pleasurable and beneficial both to the self and the other.”

Ethos was a way of being and of behavior.  It was a way of being for the subject along with a certain way of acting, visible to others.  Its presence was visible in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event.”

“For the Greeks, this was the concrete form of freedom. This was the way they problematized their freedom.”  To keep something alive we must find a way to problematize it while we live it

Whatever the perceived benefits of austerity, many free citizens in the Greek culture enjoyed a full range of bodily pleasures -- austerity was not an authoritarian demand, an imposition or requirement, but a supplement, a guide to good living.

“The theme of sexual austerity should be understood not as an expression of, or a commentary on, deep and essential prohibitions -- but as the elaboration and stylization of an activity in the exercise of its power and the practice of its liberty.”

The externalization of erotic conflict within Christianity, in which temptation comes from Satan and redemption is given by God, led to the subject seeking a new understanding of itself by means of renouncing mastery (self-control, moderation, balance), that turns the self, devoid of all of its passions, over to the will of God.

Beginning with the Greek erotics -- then in Christianity there is a new erotics -- ultimately in our own time we see several series of erotics developing serially -- histories make us think of possibilities

Although the discourse of absolute sin and evil did not make itself manifest until Christianity was firmly established, Foucault traces episodes in Roman history in which a line was crossed between austerity as a practice of individual freedom, and this new austerity as obedience to a prescriptive code of moral conduct.  This is a huge transition point in history --  it is also one of Foucault’s most powerful insights

Stoicism is a kind of midpoint: mastery over desire ultimately becomes insensitivity -- life without enjoyment of life -- mastery that has crushed the life out of life -- a victory that is no longer a victory

In one case a person sees the moral codes of his culture and is free to adapt them creatively to his own conduct -- in another there is a system in which an externally imposed series of moral rules governs the individual’s conduct via a regime of fear

Question: is there an ethics of the self that does not construct an ‘other’ as abnormal -- one that would be compatible with democracy -- with these various ‘erotics’ of the past, where are we going now -- we have to go on with the critical project and with questioning  -- the project of self-creation today -- reminders and inspirations



Wednesday, September 17, 2014

Husserl, Wittgenstein

Husserl “is not a system builder but a searcher for beginnings and his philosophy is precisely this search” ( from Robert Sokolowski, “Edmund Husserl and the Principles of Phenomenology,” in John C. Ryan, Twentieth Century Thinkers (Staten Island: Alba House, 1965), pp. 134-157) 

What Husserl calls “the principle of all principles” is that only immediate intuition is to be considered the ultimate norm and criterion for what is said in philosophy.  His standpoint appears therefore to be radically subjective. 

We can see this searching element in Husserl’s ideas about time.  His thesis is that time  -- the present instant -- is not an atomic, dimensionless unit, but contains within itself a protension into the future and retention of the past.  This idea makes it possible to think about consciousness as self-aware -- to think about consciousness of consciousness -- and to investigate this problem.

Consciousness holds its past states in present consciousness and also allows present thoughts to plan the future; holding these moments together in human extra-dimensional temporality is what it means for thought to reflect on itself -- this is "self-awareness."

Yet if we only know our own states then consciousness is self-enclosed and insular -- this seems the last result of British Empiricism and the Critical philosophy, since the ‘thing in itself’ appears to be out of reach -- Husserl gets us back to ideas that Aristotle and the scholastic traditions held, i.e. that via our senses, we grasp reality -- a stance that Descartes attacks at the beginning of modern philosophy. 

By Husserl’s teachings, there is no truth in itself; truth is a correlation to consciousness; it must be constituted by consciousness to exist at all; and since reality is what is considered as true, reality must be constituted by consciousness.  Everything hinges on human intentionality and the activity of consciousness which allows reality to manifest itself.  Tagore held a position like this in his discussions with Einstein.  It has been attacked as tending towards a radical subjectivation in philosophy.  

Although consciousness is correlated to reality as a phenomenon, it is aware of more than reality. It is also aware of itself. Consciousness does not only know reality, it also knows itself.  This knowledge of self is not an accessory, unessential adornment to the more normal knowledge of reality. Unless we are aware of ourselves, we do not know reality, for if we did not know ourselves, we would not recognize reality as something distinct from ourselves -- we need the one for the other -- other-consciousness requires some level of self-consciousness -- thus an intentional consciousness must be at work in order for reality to become a phenomenon -- the dimensionality of human temporality makes self-consciousness possible -- time makes being possible -- this idea becomes Heidegger's main thesis.  

Husserl makes subjectivity supreme but this creates some tension with the evidence for an unconscious mind -- in a case like this subjectivity is denied access to its own nature -- which means that subjectivity cannot be the basis for philosophy after all -- the subjective standpoint is most problematic when we see that there is more consciousness than we will ever be able to bring into self-consciousness.  Thus reality reemerges as a fundamental element in philosophy -- now, not in the sense that Husserl is worried about -- the process by which consciousness shapes ‘reality’ -- but in the different and enigmatic sense that there is something ‘real’ out there in the first place that consciousness shapes and colors and interprets --

Thus we are talking about reality in different senses or about different realities or levels of reality or aspects, sides, perspectives, viewpoints, or different ways of talking about the same experiences …

In the same sense that Wittgenstein saw too much language and too little reality, Husserl saw too much intentionality and too little reality.  The world we face and live in is not just mind nor just language.  

Man is capable of insight into the nature of reality as the basis of his use of language -- 
Man is capable of insight into the nature of reality as the basis of his awareness --

Thus we are at work in discovering principles of philosophy that do not assume a subjective standpoint or a linguistic standpoint, but return to classical ideas about the real as the true -- about stuff, matter