Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Confucius +/- Criticism


All over the world there are people like me who teach basic logic, critical thinking, introduction to reasoning, and beginning kinds of math, philosophy and science classes that help students get some practice in the fundamentals of objective reasoning. 

After my travels to China last year, it occurred to me to stick with the question a while and look deeper into the relation between culture and criticism.  How is teaching critical thinking handled in different cultural contexts? -- How is critical thinking taught in China, for example? 

A recent column by Steven Pinker has a beautiful quote on this subject from Anton Chekhov: “there is no national multiplication table.”  This is my yardstick -- reason has to have the same significance in all cultures -- and researching the question I have found the Pythagorean theorem, for example, in ancient Chinese, Indian, and Egyptian texts. 

Mathematics is pure reason whereas philosophy has to contend with culture and express itself in cultural, not mathematical, variables.  Philosophy looks somewhat different in Germany, France, England, Greece, Argentina, Japan, and New York City. 

Criticism really only makes sense culturally if it emerges in a cultural context and then responds: like the critique of slavery in a slave society; like the critique of masculinity in a sexist society.  So it needs a cultural context as a starting point, as Peter Bodunrin has argued.  Going on with the argument, I came to the idea that philosophy can be many things, but philosophy ceases to be philosophy without criticism.  Thus even in a culture in which the tradition is not to outdo the master or add to the sum of knowledge or to attack argument in order to test it -- for example, in a culture like that of ancient China, in which the tradition is to cherish the ancestors rather than attacking them -- even in a culture like this, there must be criticism -- otherwise, this is not philosophy.  Let us say that this is the hypothesis --then let us take a look at this in the case of ancient China. 

So I want to argue with myself whether e.g. Confucian philosophy is critical philosophy -- just to see what I am able to see -- to keep thinking by sticking with this problem.  In effect, I am testing the idea of universal reason and researching whether we can discover any “empirical” element instead (as Kant would say) -- in effect this would rule out this or that culture, this or that standard, this or that cultural icon -- which would leave us with the new hypothesis that we cannot count on every people to have developed criticism -- so philosophy only emerges in some cultures -- not in all. 

Ø What is the place of a truly critical perspective in traditional Confucian thinking? 

I am trying to ask the question, whether learning Confucianism will help a student become a critical thinker -- thinking of this merely as an example (and not as a universal proposition about cultural influence on pure abstract rationality -- supposing. there is one -- supposing that local influence outweighs very strict mathematical reasoning).

Let us argue the negative -- then there are fundamentally different patterns of thinking at work in the West and in ancient China -- so that any (supposed) absence of logic and criticism in Chinese philosophy need not be thought of as problematic in itself -- it is merely cultural prejudice and a power-wielding privileging of one system over another that makes this kind of judgment seem right -- and this amounts to a kind of intellectual colonialism and arrogation -- thus no longer argument but merely a dominant imprint. 

But -- if we are arguing for more similarity between traditions rather than differences -- Confucian “ritual propriety” (, li) seems very close to the Western idea of correct judgment (and good judgment, discriminating taste, sensitivity, rendering justice, demonstrating wise judgment).  Aristotle’s discussion of equity (επιείκεια, epieikeia) from NE 5 seems to call on the same personal kind of characteristics and a sense of the balance of all of one’s faculties -- reaching beyond mere adherence to basic routines and laws -- that Confucius hopes to instill.

Confucianism defines archetypes, first originating in the distant past, that are spelled out in classic writings, and in the biographies of renowned sages.  Thus the attitude that we are looking for — critical thinking — is described (as it were) from the outside.

The process involves looking at acts, feelings, at a person’s mindset, and his overall bearing in life.  This mindset is not really private but instead communal -- it shows itself in adhering to cultural forms and making them work -- also carrying forward, treasuring and extending the great inheritance from the past.  There is the sense of having noble ancestors to whom one returns — setting standards of aspiration — the project is to try not to shame them, to try to equal them, to try to extend their vision to the present.  

Perhaps the Greeks too felt this way about their Homeric ancestors and about the generation who defeated the Persians.

Question: can we teach criticism by teaching ‘bearing’? (A related question might be: How does one teach aspiration?) (Note: Plato says, begin to love learning a bit, and then you will begin learning.)

The humanistic Confucian worldview, deeply felt and applied, can never be mechanical but must be adapted creatively in action (again, like Aristotle’s idea of equity).  

I wonder if the Confucian worldview can help with the enormous problem of resisting falling into a mechanical way of thinking and living -- via deeply felt ritual propriety -- as a parallel with Aristotle’s conception of equity? -- In effect Aristotle represents the West in saying that there is something higher than the dull application of the law -- there is the possibility of making an exception of the law when the case demands it -- rather than applying a mechanism without any consideration of the particular case (at the opposite pole from Kant’s insistence on strictly universally exceptionless rule-following).

It seems unlikely that a people who developed a secular and observational view of the world in very ancient times, who constructed enormous building projects, who adjudicated social disputes within ideas about rational investigation and fairness, whose society made huge jumps forward in science, engineering, medicine and the arts -- a society which also did normal things -- farmed and fished and hunted -- could be deficient at reasoning. Basic facts of history seem to argue a baseline of rationality and causal thinking underlying all these achievements -- but what of probing criticism?

Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 1-3, argues that the logical theme is underdeveloped in ancient Chinese thinking, which is why we do not see explicit criticism in Confucian sources. 

The distinction seems too binary and caught up in cultural rivalry.

Consider, as counterarguments, these passages from the Analects, which suggest a critical consciousness in Confucius’ thinking:

“The Master said, That I have not cultivated virtue, that I have learned but not explained, that I have heard what is right but failed to align with it, that what is not good in me I have been unable to change – these are my worries.” 7.3

“How dare I claim to be a sage or a benevolent man?  At best it may be said of me that I learn without flagging and teach without growing weary.” 7.34

“Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi. The Master said, “You are stealing another man’s son!” Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?” The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!” 11.25

“The exemplary person seeks harmony but not conformity.” 13.23

“If you love ren, but you do not love learning, the flaw is ignorance.” 17.8

Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere.”  The Great Learning

Note use of the terms dun
(deeply sincere) and chun (simple and honest).

I think Confucius would be confused by the modern idea that young people should learn ‘critical thinking’ – he held that learning happens in stages and that rote learning is important at the beginning, to get a grasp of what great thinkers have said in former ages; when we have a good grasp of what our ancestors have said, we can begin to think critically and evaluate ideas from times past.  Thus there is a baseline of learning that precedes the critical process.  This does not mean that there is no critical process.  It just means that there is something like a qualification of age or experience.  In effect we have to learn our culture before we can take it apart -- thus: fluency before critique. 

Note the term Heart/Mind (xin ) -- a single word to refer both to the function of our minds as a cognitive, reasoning organ and a function of an affective, or emotionally responsive, organ. The word, xin, was originally represented in written form by a sketch of the heart. The heart/mind thinks rationally, feels emotionally, passes value judgments on all objects of thought and feeling, and initiates active responses in line with these judgments. Sometimes, the heart/mind is contrasted with “unthinking” aspects of people, such as basic desires and instinctual responses, but other times, these are pictured as part of the heart/mind.  There is something in us to get over and master -- this takes time -- this is something one develops -- the picture here (arguably) is something like critical thinking as a long form of self-cultivation. 

Ritual righteousness (, yi) was initially about the family, then the larger political unit, finally the Empire.  This is roughly the pattern for Greece also.  The focus on logic comes after the breakup of the defining political state (Zhou, Athens) -- it merges in a context of lessened political influence on the part of the individual.  The later Mohists and the Stoics run parallel as investigators of logic after the norm-defining political unit fell apart.  Confucian metaphysics from later times seems to take the universe as the basic unit and thus makes progress on purely abstract questions such as inference. 

Does it make sense to teach critical thinking from Confucius? -- yes and no. 

If Confucius, who was bent on learning, had a modern textbook of logic available, he would use it.  On the face of it, it seems counterintuitive to try to teach someone to think without actually working through explicit arguments -- yet reports of Confucian conversations from the Analects and other traditions appear to show principles like identity, non-contradiction and inference, without calling specific attention to them. 

To me it seems wrong to associate logic with one people (the Greeks) and to relegate all other historical peoples to some backwater where people reasoned poorly.  It is truer to say that the Greeks explicitly called this out as a subject and made great progress with it.  Other peoples followed the patterns that the Greeks investigated in their daily routines,
but may not have made the subject so explicit or thought about thinking with the same abstract universalism -- or with the same success.  Roughly: all peoples have blood types, but not all people developed the idea of a blood type -- or have categorized blood types in modern terms.  But we should not abandon blood typing for an alternative view of blood that associates it with less definable qualities or which disputes the point of view and the political reality behind the history that creates this scientific advance.  Rivalry doesn’t make sense in a context like this -- we are simply seeing what is the case. 

Critical thinking is (in a word) skepticism.  The issue is Confucian skepticism -- as see e.g. in the Tokugawa era Japanese philosopher and Confucian scholar Kaibara Ekken (1630-1715), in his work Tigiroku (Record of Major Doubts), dated 1713:

“The gentleman-scholar of novice learning cannot immediately get to the heart of things.  The way of learning must include doubt, for when one has doubt, advancement is sure to follow. Major doubts bring major progress, minor doubts bring minor progress; and when there is no doubt, then there is no progress.  This is how the way of inquisitive learning or scholarship (問, gakumon) comes to be.”

Readings in Tokugawa Thought, third edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Center for East Asian Studies, Select Papers No. 9, 1998), pp. 69-71. 

-- -- --

The importance of ritual.  When offered a first cup of tea, the guest should assume a grave attitude; when offered a second, an air of respectful contentment.  “Sacrifice implies presence; sacrifice to the gods as if they were right in front of you.” “If you do not sacrifice with your whole heart, it is better not to sacrifice at all.”  “Humaneness is, to subdue oneself and return to ritual.”  But ritual can degrade and become mere ceremoniousness – mere words with no meaning and no heart – “If a man is not humane, he no longer hears any music” (I, 3). 

Over relying on ritual.   Confucian thinking degrades over time into an arch-conservatism.  Family relationships and existing power hierarchies are endowed with magical qualities and transcendental significance – thus to oppose the father or the ruler is to fight Heaven and make oneself an outcast.  Confucianism has too often been the apologist for the existing order and thus has seemed the enemy of progressive thinking – despite Confucius’ emphasis on education, breaking down class distinctions, and progressive social agenda. 

Confucius’ ideas did not catch on until nearly 500 years after his death.  This fact may help to explain why his recommendations are so different than the actual policies adopted in his name centuries later.   

Harmony requires differences – as with music that explores various contrasting sonic ingredients, any of which might in isolation seem flat or out of tune, but together resound; as with opposite traits in the personality, that help to offset one another; as with different regions of the nation -- so that wind can correct water, north can correct south, and each tendency can be matched and steadied by its counterpart. 

The progressive attitude veers towards conservatism when people lose the confidence that they can respond to change and find new ways to create harmony; instead, they try to preserve harmony by opposing virtually everything that happens.  We cannot find harmony with or properly react to a new thing, if we do not allow ourselves to see it.