recent thoughts on theology

To Dominic Marbaniang -- who proposes a division of theology into four basic kinds -- rationalist (gods of the mountains -- up among the peaks), empiricist (gods of the valleys -- down to earth), intermediate (sharing something of both these trends), and revelational (based on "divine revelation").

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How many ways are there to talk about God?  How many distinct versions of theology are there? How many importantly different ways of talking about the divine are there -- about otherness, about the transcendent, the highest values?  -- Your classification begins with the division between rationalists and empiricists and also notes that the Critical philosophy attempts to unite these two strains from European thinking.  I think this is a clue regarding your project.  Perhaps there are as many styles of theology as there are for philosophy itself. 

If you are making a classification among types of theology, I suppose an important question is: Why are you making this distinction?  What purpose do you hope it will serve?  Naively the purpose appears to be to understand god-speech better.  Why would we classify types of philosophy?  -- Again, perhaps to understand philosophical questioning better.  Kant perhaps was able to take a step beyond rationalism and empiricism because he clearly distinguished between them and thus had a chance to rethink them and find their deeper underlying unity. 

Let us say that philosophy -- radical critical inquiry -- breaks down into differentiable types or trends -- metaphysics, logic, moral philosophy, skepticism, synthesis, holism, atomism, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, historicism -- probably others too.  Then we are likely to discover schools of theology that follow all these lines of thinking.  

Arguably, Heraclitus is a philosopher (a metaphysician or cosmologist) but also a theologian.  Plato is a moralist, yet again a moral theologian.  Spinoza, Shankara and Vivekenanda are philosophical holists, but they also make theological claims.  Sextus Empircus is a skeptic; so is Nagarjuna; and both talk about God.  

I would argue that the most important distinction among all types of theology is what you are pointing at in making out the category of 'revelational' theology.  That is: there are at least two important kinds of theology; one is experimental, humble, filled with a sense of philosophical doubt, open to revision, open to interpretation, asserted with a questioning and tentative spirit; but another kind is asserted with the summit of human arrogance -- asserted as final, as binding on everyone, as necessary. 

When philosophers start talking about God, there is a kind of test: they cease being philosophers and become dogmatists instead; or they keep their philosophical scruples and tread cautiously in this very troubled, divided land.  

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To Peter Boghossian -- who proposes to dispense with faith, taken as a delusory knowledge claim.

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Your study brings up the huge question that emerges out of Western philosophical history in the Medieval period.  For over 1000 years Western philosophy was the ancilla theologiae, the handmaiden of theology -- philosophy the servant of faith.  Much amazing work was done in philosophy during this period -- Augustine, Bonaventure, Anselm, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas.  There is the interesting push-and-pull between followers of Plato like Augustine and followers of Aristotle like Aquinas.  This same dynamic exists in Judaic, Christian and Islamic philosophy pretty much from the end of the Hellenistic period to the beginnings of the Renaissance.  Aquinas refers to this whole period and his own investigations as fides quereans intellectum -- faith seeking understanding -- as if faith were the questioner and intellect/understanding was the person being interrogated.  You dismiss all this work out of hand with your pronouncements and in the end you may be right.  But I think the period deserves study -- and respect -- there may even be an essential lesson buried in this history.  
Philosophy was the handmaiden of theology; then, freed from the yoke around its neck, it recovered the humanistic tradition from the ancients; this created the conditions in which empirical science was born.  But then philosophy became ancilla scientia -- philosophy became the handmaid, the servant, of science.  The history of philosophy seems to suggest that philosophy has to take an instrumental role.  Philosophy has to serve a purpose -- thus the clarification of thoughts that philosophy undertakes has to serve a purpose -- hopefully, a socially useful purpose.  What purpose is philosophy intended to serve?

Philosophy has to be ancilla vitae -- the servant of life.  Thoughtfulness is a good in itself and a pleasure to engage in.  But thoughtfulness brings us to moral conclusions and thus directs us from thought to action -- thinking serving life.  Philosophy serves a purpose and has an instrumental role -- but not, apparently, that of upholding a cause.  Thoughtfulness serves life by examining it.  Thoughtfulness serves life by creating more thoughtfulness.


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Question: If philosophy is a way of emancipating ourselves from stupidity (superstition, epistemic arrogance), then -- once we are emancipated -- what do we do with thoughtfulness?  


Answer: We never emancipate ourselves from stupidity -- there is no step beyond thoughtfulness.  


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A good place to see this is in the Euthyphro and Socrates' discussion there about piety (to hosian).

Socrates is challenging this person who sees himself as knowledgeable about the gods, about ceremonies, religious duties, sacrifices, rituals of all sorts -- Euthyphro is very cocksure about his "knowledge" -- so much so that he is willing to go to the law courts to sue his father who, he thinks, is guilty of impiety and should be punished.  Socrates of course is also charged with impiety.  Now Euthyphro is certainly someone who would agree that faith makes claims about knowledge -- although his vocabulary is very different than the one we are using -- he thinks he knows what piety is and he can cite many examples of piety -- pious deeds, pious men.  But then he has a conversation with Socrates.  In order to be pious, it seems that we have to know what piety is.  Things that please the gods are pious.  But are they pious because they please the gods, or do they please the gods because they are pious?  And in the end the conversation is (of course) aporetic -- it leads nowhere -- it goes around in circles.  Euthyphro is forced to admit that he does not know what piety is.  

Euthyphro doesn't have any problem using the 'concept' of piety (though 'concept' is not what Greeks call it  -- Solon calls it aphanes metron, a non-appearing measure, Plato calls it idea).  But when he examines this thing -- whatever it is -- his clarity vanishes and he realizes that he does not know what he is talking about.   Socrates wants to start the conversation all over again when they discover that neither of them knows what piety is.  Euthyphro walks away.  

Now Socrates is challenging Euthyphro's arrogance, his knowledge claim, his cocksure attitude, and he wants to bring Euthyphro to the same condition that he himself is in -- ignorance, self-conscious ignorance, and humility in place of arrogance.  

But here is what strikes me: he is not trying to make Euthyphro less pious.  Likewise, when he is talking about courage with Laches and Nicias, there is the same result.  But he is not trying to say that these men are not courageous or that there is no bravery in Athens.  Socrates considers justice, piety, temperance, courage and magnanimity to be virtues -- even though he cannot define any of them and cannot say anything definitive about these ideas.  

What I take this to mean is that he is encouraging us to become thoughtful.  Becoming thoughtful is dangerous. It will spoil our illusion that we know what we are doing.  But this is the right kind of life for us -- the examined life -- in spite of all its difficulties.  The point is: Socrates is not arguing for any kind of result that would make further thinking unnecessary.  He wants us to think, to stay in thinking, and bring this problem-seeking behavior with us to all life's experiences.  But he is not trying to take anything away -- except arrogance.  He is not trying to make people less just, virtuous, temperate or pious.  That would imply a new creed -- a new result -- a new account of piety or courage -- but the whole point is that he has no results.  There is, instead, the work of thinking.

You say: reason shows us that certain positions are a priori irrational and thus can be rejected out of hand.  Thus I can reject the notion that the moon is made of cheese.  And for similar reasons you argue that we can reject faith also.  Thus your effort appears to be aimed at taking away certain propositions -- rather than taking away arrogance.  I would argue that philosophy is not about disabusing people of false beliefs and replacing them with true ones; it is more about teaching a general attitude of humility -- of thoughtfulness -- something to be applied in all situations and in every sort of culture -- whether we worship trees or gods or stones -- whatever tradition we belong to.  

I guess my position, which I think is the Socratic position, is that I do not care if a person is religious or irreligious -- I do not care what beliefs or symbols or rituals he entertains, or whether she is devout or an atheist -- this sort of thing does not concern me -- the essential thing is not the idiom in which a person makes a life, but that the person be thoughtful.  That she examine her life.  And this does not square with rejecting specific claims, in favor of different accounts.  It only squares with rejecting arrogance.  Not what the person thinks; but how.